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(1971) Analecta Husserliana, Dordrecht, Reidel.

Husserl's concept of intentionality

J. N. Mohanty

pp. 100-132

It may not be an overstatement to say that the development of Husserl’s thought can be adequately grasped if only we followed the development of his concept of intentionality. The same could also be said of the development of phenomenology after Husserl. There are no doubt some excellent studies on Husserl’s concept of intentionality1, but what is still lacking is a comprehensive account which would take into account the total Husserliana which are only now coming to be made available to scholars. Furthermore, we also do not have a study which undertakes to assess Husserl’s concept of intentionality from the point of view of the criticisms and challenges emerging out of the writings of the post-Husserlian phenomenologists. This paper will make an attempt to fulfil these two needs but only within the brief compass permissible here. There will be first an attempt to explore the philosophical relationship of Husserl’s concept of intentionality to Brentano’s. An exposition will next be given of Husserl’s concept through the various phases of its development. This will be followed by a reference to the criticisms and challenges made by the later phenomenologists like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, and the concluding part of the paper will seek to evaluate the points made by the critics and in that connection take a fresh look at Husserl’s thought against the new perspective gained thereby.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-3326-8_6

Full citation:

Mohanty, J.N. (1971)., Husserl's concept of intentionality, in A. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Dordrecht, Reidel, pp. 100-132.

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