Newsletter of Phenomenology

Keeping phenomenologists informed since May 2002

Repository | Book | Chapter

Horizonality and legitimation in perception, affectivity, and volition

Roberto Walton

pp. 3-20

Husserl states that "the different types of reason interpenetrate themselves and constitute a unique reason with essential sides" (Hua XXVIII, 228). In this chapter, the author attempts to show how this uniqueness appears in different levels of reason and in the threefold dimension of subjective life. The chapter starts with an analysis of the supporting roots of reason. A primal hyle, a primal feeling, and primal kinestheses—the basis of perception, affectivity, and volition—converge in a primal horizon in which the mother soil of reason is to be found. A play of intention and fulfillment, the adjustment to standards, and teleological processes, can be discerned in a hidden reason that is tied to instincts. On the breakdown of instinct, a natural reason asserts itself by holding itself to standards represented by average achievement. In turn, philosophical reason is tied to the introduction of a priori norms, and operates through similar processes in the realms of perception, affectivity, and volition. First, a distinction of empty intentions and their fulfillment, along with processes of modalization, can be shown within the framework outlined by horizons. Analogous stages regarding the establishment of meaning and the attainment of truth are common both to theoretical and practical reason. Second, an a priori regulation through standards afforded by essences and values can also be shown. The three spheres are subject to norms that regulate the fulfillment of empty intentions. Finally, the progress of knowledge has its parallel in an open axiological linkage that attempts to attain the best possible value at each stage of an approach to infinite ideas.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-55340-5_1

Full citation:

Walton, R. (2017)., Horizonality and legitimation in perception, affectivity, and volition, in R. Walton, S. Taguchi & R. Rubio (eds.), Perception, affectivity, and volition in Husserl's phenomenology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 3-20.

This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.