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(1998) Phenomenology in Japan, Dordrecht, Springer.

On the semantic duplicity of the first person pronoun "I"

Hiroshi Kojima

pp. 83-96

We are accustomed to using the first person pronoun "I" automatically, as it were, or almost unconsciously in daily life, convinced that we sufficiently know the meaning of it. But when we reflect upon it more attentively, it suddenly becomes clear that the pronoun "I" does not have as simple a meaning as we would think, but rather a doubled meaning that we hardly ever anticipated. The following is a rough phenomenological sketch of these meanings and of the ontological structure of the ego that reflects upon them.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-2602-3_6

Full citation:

Kojima, H. (1998)., On the semantic duplicity of the first person pronoun "I", in A. Steinbock (ed.), Phenomenology in Japan, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 83-96.

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