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(2014) Karl Jaspers' philosophy and psychopathology, Dordrecht, Springer.

Karl Jaspers on primary delusional experiences of schizophrenics

his concept of delusion compared to that of the dsm

Alfred Kraus

pp. 109-124

The diagnostics and classification of the delusion of schizophrenics in DSM-IV-TM as well as in the AGP-system are largely based on Jaspers' definition of delusion as pathologically falsified judgements. The following differences to Jaspers concept of delusion are shown: 1. Contrary to the general definition of schizophrenic delusion in DSM-IV-TM as enormous beliefs usually involving misinterpretations of perceptions on experiences according to Jaspers pathologically falsified judgements as a secondary product belong to later stages of delusion. Delusional atmosphere and delusional perception appearing in primary delusion are in Jaspers' view characterized by an immediate, intuitive knowledge of the meaning. 2. Jaspers' differentiation between original primary delusional experiences and the judgements based on these is not considered in DSM-IV-TM. 3. The phenomenal specificity of Jaspers' criteria of delusion, showing itself not only in quantitative but also in qualitative aspects is not sufficiently expressed in the manual. 4. The comprehensively altered consciousness of reality in primary delusional experiences points to an alteration of s.c. existential a prioris (Kraus 2012) which is, in our opinion, of constitutive significance for the phenomena of schizophrenic delusion.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-8878-1_8

Full citation:

Kraus, A. (2014)., Karl Jaspers on primary delusional experiences of schizophrenics: his concept of delusion compared to that of the dsm, in T. Fuchs, T. Breyer & C. Mundt (eds.), Karl Jaspers' philosophy and psychopathology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 109-124.

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