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121393

(2014) Self and other, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Shame

Dan Zahavi

pp. 208-240

This chapter engages with the topic of shame. What does the fact that we feel shame tell us about the nature of self? Does shame testify to the presence of a self-concept, a (failed) self-ideal, and a capacity for critical self-assessment, or does it rather, as some have suggested, point to the fact that the self is in part socially constructed? Should shame primarily be classified as a self-conscious emotion or is it rather a distinct social emotion, or is there something misleading about these alternatives? The chapter explores these questions and discusses whether the experience of shame presupposes a possession of a first-person perspective and a capacity for empathy, and whether it exemplifies an other-mediated form of self-experience and to that extent involves a more complex self than the thin experiential self.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590681.003.0014

Full citation:

Zahavi, D. (2014). Shame, in Self and other, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 208-240.

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