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(2011) Husserl Studies 27 (2).

Meaning and intuitive act in the logical investigations

Ka-Wing Leung

pp. 125-142

This essay attempts to approach the dispute over the conceptualist or non-conceptualist interpretation of Husserl's conception of intentional experience from a specific question: Is the intuitive act essentially a carrier of meaning? In the sixth Investigation, Husserl apparently tries to show that intuition is no carrier of meaning and therefore must be unified with a meaning-conferring act in order to be meaningful. But it seems to me that the brief arguments given by Husserl here are far from conclusive and that there are passages in the Logical Investigations which suggest otherwise. I will try to demonstrate that the sense conferred by the interpretation in perception is not different from linguistic meaning, and therefore perception is actually a synthetic act of fulfillment and is always meaningful. The conceptualist reading is no less convincing and no less susceptible to objections than the non-conceptualist one.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s10743-010-9086-2

Full citation:

Leung, K.-W. (2011). Meaning and intuitive act in the logical investigations. Husserl Studies 27 (2), pp. 125-142.

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