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(2014) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2).
Neural representationalism, the hard problem of content and vitiated verdicts
a reply to Hutto & Myin (2013)
Matteo Colombo
pp. 257-274
Colombo's (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) plea for neural representationalism is the focus of a recent contribution to Phenomenology and Cognitive Science by Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin. In that paper, Hutto and Myin have tried to show that my arguments fail badly. Here, I want to respond to their critique clarifying the type of neural representationalism put forward in my (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) piece, and to take the opportunity to make a few remarks of general interest concerning what Hutto and Myin have dubbed "the Hard Problem of Content."
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-014-9350-6
Full citation:
Colombo, M. (2014). Neural representationalism, the hard problem of content and vitiated verdicts: a reply to Hutto & Myin (2013). Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2), pp. 257-274.
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