Newsletter of Phenomenology

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Other minds embodied

Søren Overgaard

pp. 65-80

I distinguish three kinds of other minds problems—conceptual, epistemological and empirical. I argue that while Merleau-Ponty believes embodiment helps with tackling the conceptual and epistemological problems, he suggests that it is of no clear use in solving (an important variant of) the empirical problem. I sketch some considerations that could lend support to Merleau-Ponty's claims about the conceptual and epistemological problems, without claiming that these are conclusive. I then proceed to argue that Merleau-Ponty's take on the empirical problem is essentially correct.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11007-016-9388-y

Full citation:

Overgaard, S. (2017). Other minds embodied. Continental Philosophy Review 50 (1), pp. 65-80.

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