The structure of interpersonal experience
This chapter develops a phenomenological account of what it is to encounter someone as a person, an achievement that many discussions of intersubjectivity presuppose rather than address. I take, as a starting point, Sartre's view in Being and Nothingness that our sense of others is pre-conceptual, bodily and involves a distinctive way of experiencing possibilities. I concede that Sartre's emphasis on the loss of possibilities is too restrictive, but defend this more general view. In so doing, I consider some alterations in the structure of interpersonal experience that can occur in psychiatric illness. I propose that they are best interpreted as changes in a felt sense of possibility that is constitutive of our sense of others as persons.
Ratcliffe, M. (2013)., The structure of interpersonal experience, in D. Moran (ed.), The phenomenology of embodied subjectivity, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 221-238.
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