A husserlian, neurophenomenologic approach to embodiment
Normally, we perfectly know where we are: we know that we are viewing the world from a particular and unique point of view. We know that we inhabit the physical body that is situated precisely at this same point of space. We localize ourselves in an absolute manner: definitely, we are "here'! We know where our hand is without having to watch it constantly, and we move our body without having to look around to know where it went. We can reach out for an object close at hand without having to fix it attentively in advance in order not to miss it. Such "knowledge' (a misnomer) is indispensable in order for us to deal in a rapid, silent, adaptive and efficacious way with our customary occupations and duties. It is only when anomalies occur linked to cerebral lesions which make unreliable this implicit "knowledge' and distort our experience that we become aware of the fact that this experience is contingent upon unknown conditions. Conditions that neuroscience help us understand by linking them to dysfunctions of the mechanisms underlying our sense of the moving body: "kinaesthesia'.
Petit, J.-L. (2010)., A husserlian, neurophenomenologic approach to embodiment, in S. Gallagher & D. Schmicking (eds.), Handbook of phenomenology and cognitive science, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 201-216.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.