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(1988) Perspectives on mind, Dordrecht, Springer.

Introduction

Herbert Otto, James Tuedio

pp. 1-2

Phenomenology and analytic philosophy have skirmished often, but seldom in ways conducive to dialectical progress. Generally, the skirmishes seem more "political" than philosophical, as when one side ridicules the methods of the other or criticizes the viability of the other's issues and assumptions. Analytic interest in third person objectivity is often spurned by Continental philosophers as being unduly abstract. Continental interest in first person subjectivity is often criticized by analysts as being muddled and imprecise. Logical analysis confronts the power of metaphor and judges it "too ambiguous" for rigorous philosophical activity. The language of metaphor confronts the power of logical analysis and deems it "too restrictive" for describing the nature and structures of authentic human experience. But are the two approaches really incompatible?

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-4033-8_1

Full citation:

Otto, H. , Tuedio, J. (1988)., Introduction, in H. Otto & J. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on mind, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 1-2.

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