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(2015) Performance and temporalisation, Dordrecht, Springer.

The body in time/time in the body

Lanei Rodemeyer

pp. 129-138

How does the body participate in time? From a phenomenological perspective, we usually consider time in relation with consciousness. In fact (for Husserl, at least), time is the most fundamental structure of consciousness. More precisely, time — or rather, temporalising — is what consciousness does. But the body, as a living, sensing thing, is already infused with consciousness, even if it is not always — or even usually — at the level of active, embodied self-awareness. Thus, given this temporalising structure of consciousness and the implicit relation of the perceiving body with consciousness, we must inquire into how the perceiving body might participate in the temporalising usually ascribed to consciousness alone. Does the body retain immediate memories, or recollect more distant ones? Can it anticipate the more immediate or distant future? If it does, how does it do so?

Publication details

DOI: 10.1057/9781137410276_10

Full citation:

Rodemeyer, L. (2015)., The body in time/time in the body, in S. Grant, J. Mcneilly-Renaudie & M. Veerapen (eds.), Performance and temporalisation, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 129-138.

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