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(2007) The rediscovery of common sense philosophy, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

Metaphysical realism as a pre-condition of visual perception

Stephen Boulter

pp. 98-117

So far in this book I have been at pains to address, or at least begin to address, three of the five principal tasks of the common sense philosopher as they were set out in Chapter 1. I have explained what counts as a common sense belief and have provided an argument to back up the intuition that such beliefs ought to be treated as default positions (tasks 1 and 2). I have also attempted in Chapters 3 and 4 to provide a general explanation as to why it is that philosophers so often end up denying what we all know to be true (task 4). Now, in the remainder of this work, I turn to the third of the principal tasks, namely, the piecemeal, laborious and seemingly endless job of dealing with particular challenges to particular common sense beliefs mounted by highly respected and respectable philosophers. In order to illustrate the methodology and approach of the common sense philosopher in action, I have chosen to examine a number of recent challenges on topics ranging from metaphysics to ethics.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1057/9780230223134_5

Full citation:

Boulter, S. (2007). Metaphysical realism as a pre-condition of visual perception, in The rediscovery of common sense philosophy, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 98-117.

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