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(2017) Pragmatism in transition, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

The pragmatic theory of the a priori

David J. Stump

pp. 147-167

Lewis's pragmatic theory of the a priori is given a partial defense. Though the strictly logical function may be vulnerable to Quinean objections, there is an epistemological function of the a priori that is not. Lewis's use of Einstein on simultaneity has problems, but correcting for those errors does not affect the basic idea. Lewis's theory of the pragmatic a priori is then contrasted with the similar ideas in Arthur Pap, who Lewis influenced, as well as Michael Friedman and Hasok Chang.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-52863-2_7

Full citation:

Stump, D. J. (2017)., The pragmatic theory of the a priori, in P. Olen & C. Sachs (eds.), Pragmatism in transition, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 147-167.

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