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In the three decades since the publication of Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language the claim that the meaning of linguistic expressions should be explained in normative terms has been one of the most debated issues in the analytic philosophy of language. A line of arguing against this claim that has gained prominence in the recent years starts off with the assumption that the norms that are involved in linguistic meanings must be either constitutive or prescriptive.It is fairly obvious that linguistic norms cannot be understood as constitutive in the simple sense in which rules of chess are constitutive: a wrong use of a word is, in many cases, still a use of this word. However, if linguistic norms are understood as prescriptive norms, serious problems arise as well. For the relevant sense of "ought" is difficult to establish. What exactly ought I do to act in accordance with the norm? Ought I use the word "green" only in reference to things that are green? This is obviously not a genuine norm, as I might just as well be joking or lying. Ought I use the word "green" only when I mean green by it? This explains nothing.I propose an analysis of the normativity of linguistic meaning that steers free of these problems. I will argue that we should understand linguistic norms as globally, but not locally, constitutive, and that the constitutiveness of linguistic norms is grounded in the structure of interpretability of linguistic practice.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-09375-8_5

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