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The paper is divided into four sections. The first one examines the hypothesis about whether the sharp distinction between two kinds of the normative requirements of rationality: the substantive and the non-substantive is a plausible view, given we can show that at least one particular non-substantive requirement of local attitudinal coherence is inscribed into the very idea of genuine normative requirement of whatever source. The second considers a particular version of a popular argument in favor of the substantive construal of the normativity of rationality that builds on the putative analogy between the normativity of rationality and the normativity of morality. The conclusion is that the argument remains unsuccesful because the analogy shows to be apparent. Section 8.3 explores the First-Personal Authority Account as an argument for the non-substantive normativity of rationality, and rejects it on the ground of its irrelevance. It is argued that the main problem with the the First-Personal Authority Account is that instead of establishing that attitudinal coherence is a normative claim of rationality, it provides support for the psychological interpretation of the normativity of rationality. Finally, granted that the arguments in the above sections are roughly correct, and the idea of the intrinsic normativity of rationality remains a muddle, a radical solution is advocated for. Instead of working hard on vindicating the normativity of rationality, we should rather rest content with the view that the only normativity of rationality for which we have support has external source in what we care about.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-09375-8_8

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