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(2015) Problems of normativity, rules and rule-following, Dordrecht, Springer.
In this study, I intend to contribute to a better understanding of what kind of thing an obligation is and what its defining features are. Central to the conception I will put forward is the idea of obligation as having two essential aspects: one of these lies in the internal connection of obligation with moral practical reasons and is accordingly rational and moral; the other one instead lies in the conceptual link between obligation and requiredness, or mandatory force. In combination these two aspects, which interlock to form what I would call the duality of obligation, frame obligation as a rational and morally justifiable categorical requirement.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-09375-8_11
Full citation:
Bertea, S. (2015)., Obligation: a legal-theoretical perspective, in M. Araszkiewicz, P. Banaś, T. Gizbert-Studnicki & K. Płeszka (eds.), Problems of normativity, rules and rule-following, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 147-163.
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