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(2009) Synthese 170 (2).

What concepts do

Kevan Edwards

pp. 289-310

This paper identifies and criticizes a line of reasoning that has played a substantial role in the widespread rejection of the view that Fodor has dubbed “Concept Atomism”. The line of reasoning is not only fallacious, but its application in the present case rests on a misconception about the explanatory potential of Concept Atomism. This diagnosis suggests the possibility of a new polemical strategy in support of Concept Atomism. The new strategy is more comprehensive than that which defenders of the view, namely Fodor, have employed.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9584-y

Full citation:

Edwards, K. (2009). What concepts do. Synthese 170 (2), pp. 289-310.

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