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(2006) Synthese 151 (2).

Human zombies are metaphysically impossible

pp. 297-310

Chalmers (The Conscious Mind, Oxford Unversity Press, Oxford 1996) has argued for a form of property dualism on the basis of the concept of a zombie (which is physically identical to normals), and the concept of the inverted spectrum. He asserts that these concepts show that the facts about consciousness, such as experience or qualia, are really further facts about our world, over and above the physical facts. He claims that they are the hard part of the mind-body issue. He also claims that consciousness is a fundamental feature of the world like mass, charge, etc.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-004-8006-4

Full citation:

(2006). Human zombies are metaphysically impossible. Synthese 151 (2), pp. 297-310.

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