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(2008) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3).
Human moral responsibility is moral responsibility enough
a reply to F. Allan Hanson
Ronald N. Giere
pp. 425-427
Hanson claims that moral responsibility should be distributed among both the humans and artifacts comprising complex wholes that produce morally relevant outcomes in the world. I argue that this claim is not sufficiently supported. In particular, adopting a consequentialist understanding of morality does not by itself support the view that the existence of a causally necessary object in such a complex whole is sufficient for assigning moral responsibility to that object. Moreover, there are good reasons, both evolutionary and contemporary, for not adopting this stance.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-008-9095-1
Full citation:
Giere, R. N. (2008). Human moral responsibility is moral responsibility enough: a reply to F. Allan Hanson. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3), pp. 425-427.
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