Repository | Book | Chapter

In this paper, intended to highlight the role of reasoning from analogy in philosophical discourse, the author addresses first the question of whether this discourse is or not argumentative, i.e. whether it is subordinated to the same conditions which make argumentation in ordinary language possible. He further holds that this does not concern rhetoric, but rather a theory of argument itself: it is a question of finding out if philosophical discourse can be analysed and represented—diagrammatically or in any other way—as discourse where we argue, i.e. whether presenting reasons as the grounds for claims argued and/or to be argued. The old divide between explanation and argumentation is hereunder retrieved and mirrored in the parallel and correlated distinction between explanatory analogies and argumentative analogies. A set of examples of these two types of analogies in philosophy history is studied and analysed in detail herein. The author concludes by outlining, not only the importance, but also the limits and constraints of analogical reasoning in philosophy.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-06334-8_16

Full citation: