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Brentano on the dual relation of the mental

Mark Textor

pp. 465-483

Brentano held that every mental phenomenon has an object and is conscious (the dual relation thesis). The dual relation thesis faces a number of well-known problems. The paper explores how Brentano tried to overcome these problems. In considering Brentano's responses, the paper sheds light on Brentano's theory of judgement that underpins his philosophy of mind.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-012-9281-z

Full citation:

Textor, M. (2013). Brentano on the dual relation of the mental. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3), pp. 465-483.

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