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(2010) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3).
Reconstructing the minimal self, or how to make sense of agency and ownership
Sanneke de Haan, Leon de Bruin
pp. 373-396
We challenge Gallagher's distinction between the sense of ownership (SO) and the sense of agency (SA) as two separable modalities of experience of the minimal self and argue that a careful investigation of the examples provided to promote this distinction in fact reveals that SO and SA are intimately related and modulate each other. We propose a way to differentiate between the various notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably in the debate, and suggest a more gradual reading of the two that allows for various blends of SO and SA. Such an approach not only provides us with a richer phenomenology but also with a more parsimonious view of the minimal self.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-009-9148-0
Full citation:
de Haan, , de Bruin, L. (2010). Reconstructing the minimal self, or how to make sense of agency and ownership. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3), pp. 373-396.
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