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(2017) European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 9 (2).
We generally consider that we should not believe on the basis of insufficient evidence. Yet there are many beliefs which are deprived of adequate epistemic evidence. In such cases, James recommends the “subjective method” which allows us to hold beliefs for practical reasons. This pragmatist move is rejected by evidentialists who think that beliefs must be grounded on adequate epistemic evidence. My contention is that Reid’s approach to irresistible beliefs we do not hold for epistemic reasons offers a persuasive means to escape the contemporary stalemate between evidentialism and pragmatism. Are we rational in holding beliefs for which we don’t possess sufficient epistemic evidence?
Publication details
DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.1044
Full citation:
Thébert, A. (2017). A permissivist ethics of belief: what pragmatism may learn from common sense. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 9 (2), pp. n/a.
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