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The number of writings on truth-making which have been published since Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry Smith's seminal, rich and deep article "Truth-Makers' in 1984 is considerable. Some deal with the theory of the notion, some with its applications and some with both. This chapter adds up to the pile of writings which focus on the theory. I focus on one account of truth-making I find plausible, the view that for a truth-bearer to be made true by an entity is for it to be the case that the truth-bearer is true because the entity exists, where "because' is understood as expressing a form of objective, metaphysical explanation which is now often subsumed under the label "grounding'. Taking this account for granted, we may distinguish, amongst the general principles governing truth-making, those which derive from more basic principles governing the notions in terms of which it is defined, from those which do not. Which principles compose the first class, which are the more basic principles from which they derive and how do the former derive from the latter? I try to make some steps towards an answer to this difficult question.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-04199-5_6

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