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"Science does not rest on a rockbed. Its towering edifice, an amazingly bold structure of theories, rises over a swamp," wrote Karl Popper (1902–1994) in the fall of 1932. "The foundations are piers going down into the swamp from above. They do not reach a natural base, but ... one resolves to be satisfied with their firmness, hoping they will carry the structure. ... The objectivity of science can be bought only at the cost of relativity.¹ The tower over the swamp represented the end of foundationist philosophy. Objectivity no longer rested on a rockbed but on the turns of scientific experimentation and criticism, as much a matter of vagary and luck as of talent and method. Surely, historians should have written Popper into the hall of fame of nonfoundationist philosophers. They did not. In fact, recent scholarship on the Vienna Circle, especially on Otto Neurath, represents Popper as the foundationist philosopher par-excellence. Some of his followers seem to miss his nonfoundationism, too. A House Built on Sand is the title Popperian philosopher Noretta Koertge chose for a spirited collection of essays that takes aim at the follies of science studies.² Alas, Popper describes science itself as built on sand (so whatever is wrong with science studies, it cannot be their choice of bedrock). But, then, why should historians and philosophers care about misreadings of Popper? Because they create a distorted picture of interwar Viennese philosophy that obscures, rather than reveals its contemporary relevance. This essay, focusing on the Neurath-Popper debate, attempts to redraw the picture and set the record straight.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-1785-4_24

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