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Scientific philosophy from Helmholtz to Carnap and Quine

Michael Friedman

pp. 1-11

The concept of a "scientific philosophy" (wissenschaftliche Philosophie) first developed in the mid nineteenth century, as a reaction against what was viewed as the excessively speculative and metaphysical character of post-Kantian German idealism. One of the primary intellectual models of this movement was a celebrated address by Hermann von Helmholtz, "Über das Sehen des Menschen," delivered at the dedication of a monument to Kant at Königsberg in 1855. Helmholtz begins by asking, on behalf of the audience, why a natural scientist like himself is speaking in honor of a philosopher. This question only arises, he says, because of the current deplorable climate of enmity and mutual distrust between the two fields – a climate which is due, in Helmholtz's opinion, to the entirely speculative system of Naturphilosophie that Schelling and Hegel have erected wholly independent of, and even in open hostility towards, the actual positive results of the natural sciences. What Helmholtz is now recommending, however, is a return to the close cooperation between the two fields exemplified in the work of Kant, who himself made significant contributions to natural science (in his nebular hypothesis put forward in 1755), and, in general, "stood in relation to the natural sciences together with the natural scientists on precisely the same fundamental principles."1 And it was this recommendation that was enthusiastically embraced within the emerging "back to Kant!" movement, where it led to the idea that all metaphysics should be replaced by the new discipline of "epistemology" or "theory of knowledge" (Erkenntnistheorie), so that philosophy itself would now become "scientific."

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-3929-1_1

Full citation:

Friedman, M. (2012)., Scientific philosophy from Helmholtz to Carnap and Quine, in R. Creath (ed.), Rudolf Carnap and the legacy of logical empiricism, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 1-11.

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