Newsletter of Phenomenology

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178502

(2016) Identity and difference, Dordrecht, Springer.

Specifically human?

the limited conception of self-consciousness in theories of reflective endorsement

Irene Bucelli

pp. 105-128

Human beings act, and it is intuitive to think that they are agents in a rather unique way, one that is different from other animals. Human beings can act for reasons. In particular, human actions can be subject to normative considerations, raising the issue of whether one should or should not act in a certain way under certain circumstances.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-40427-1_5

Full citation:

Bucelli, I. (2016)., Specifically human?: the limited conception of self-consciousness in theories of reflective endorsement, in R. Winkler (ed.), Identity and difference, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 105-128.

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