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182891

(1981) Science and society, Dordrecht, Springer.

Sociologism in philosophy of science

Joseph Agassi

pp. 85-103

In a nutshell, the present chapter claims this: First, the classical problem of knowledge has recently shifted from, How do I know? to, How do we know? — from psychology to sociology. As a phenomenological matter this is a great improvement, as a solution to the problem of rationality it is erroneous and immoral. The problem, (Why) should I act, believe, etc., this or that way? is answered: You should do so on the authority of your reason. But change the problem of rationality in accord with the change in the problem of knowledge, and ask, (Why) should we — rather than I — act or believe as we do? and the answer is clear: We should act and believe as we do, because our society is as it is, and should be as it is. This is clearly the same as, we should because we should. Not very enlightening.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-6456-6_8

Full citation:

Agassi, J. (1981). Sociologism in philosophy of science, in Science and society, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 85-103.

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