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Models, representation and incompatibility

a contribution to the epistemological debate on the philosophy of physics

Andrés Rivadulla

pp. 521-532

Theoretical models play a fundamental role in the methodology of theoretical physics. There is no branch in contemporary physics, whether it be cosmology, astrophysics or microphysics, where such models are not used.Theoretical models are idealized constructs of a single phenomenon or about a limited empirical domain. They are intended to both save the phenomena and to make testable predictions about the domain they are concerned with. In any case, models are not susceptible to being true or verisimilar representations of certain aspects of reality. On this point, I disagree with most realist philosophers of science.Models make use of extant theories and are of particular use in domains lacking theories. Moreover, in a historical sequence of theoretical models about a certain domain, not every model is compatible with previous ones. This is the case of Ptolemaic and Copernican cosmological models or of Einsteinian and Newtonian gravitational models. The incompatibility among models (and even theories) about the same domain is the most serious issue facing standard convergent realism. In order to illustrate this situation, I am going to focus on various kinds of theoretical models employed by nuclear physics.

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Full citation:

Rivadulla, A. (2016)., Models, representation and incompatibility: a contribution to the epistemological debate on the philosophy of physics, in J. Redmond, O. Martins & Ã. Fernández (eds.), Epistemology, knowledge and the impact of interaction, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 521-532.

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