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(2016) David Hume, sceptic, Dordrecht, Springer.

The empiricist roots of Hume's scepticism

Zuzana Parusniková

pp. 27-45

Hume abandoned all questions concerning the origins of perceptions and shifted his attention to internal mental processes. Epistemology is concerned with mapping the mind and Hume thus delineated a new area of philosophical inquiry that later led to the emergence of disciplines like the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Yet these inquiries brought to light another level of scepticism. Empiricism proceeds from the rule that all knowledge must be based on observation and experience. But neither the idea of causation nor distinct existence can be derived from experience; they are based on instincts and imagination, not on reason. This conclusion seems damaging for the status of science. At that time of advancing modernity, culminating in the Enlightenment confidence in reason and cognitive optimism, such a conclusion was very disturbing indeed. Epistemology was supposed to provide rational foundations for science and this was what Hume could not deliver. Hume, however, was not concerned about natural science. He appreciated Newton's method and presumed that by its application to human sciences this new experimental approach would be enriched, bringing new and much needed discoveries about human nature.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-43794-1_2

Full citation:

Parusniková, Z. (2016). The empiricist roots of Hume's scepticism, in David Hume, sceptic, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 27-45.

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