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(2013) Paraconsistency, Dordrecht, Springer.

Making sense of paraconsistent logic

the nature of logic, classical logic and paraconsistent logic

Koji Tanaka

pp. 15-25

Max Cresswell and Hilary Putnam seem to hold the view, often shared by classical logicians, that paraconsistent logic has not been made sense of, despite its well-developed mathematics. In this paper, I examine the nature of logic in order to understand what it means to make sense of logic. I then show that, just as one can make sense of non-normal modal logics (as Cresswell demonstrates), we can make 'sense" of paraconsistent logic. Finally, I turn the tables on classical logicians and ask what sense can be made of explosive reasoning. While I acknowledge a bias on this issue, it is not clear that even classical logicians can answer this question.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-4438-7_2

Full citation:

Tanaka, K. (2013)., Making sense of paraconsistent logic: the nature of logic, classical logic and paraconsistent logic, in K. Tanaka, F. Berto, E. D. Mares & F. Paoli (eds.), Paraconsistency, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 15-25.

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