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211570

(2014) Frames and concept types, Dordrecht, Springer.

Interests in conceptual changes

a frame analysis

Xiang Chen

pp. 111-122

In this article, I analyze how interests affect the results of scientific change through concept representation and categorization. I first review two models offered by cognitive psychology, which use frames as the representational structure to account for how interests actually affect concept representation and categorization. I then use a historical case from nineteenth-century optics to illustrate how the interests of historical figures influenced their concept representations, then their classifications and finally the results of their theory appraisal. I conclude that the impact of interests on science is constrained by the states of the world and interests alone can never decide the results of scientific change.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-01541-5_5

Full citation:

Chen, X. (2014)., Interests in conceptual changes: a frame analysis, in T. Gamerschlag, D. Gerland, R. Osswald & W. Petersen (eds.), Frames and concept types, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 111-122.

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