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Discussions within the philosophy of love, at least within the analytic tradition, have (for some time now) focused upon the question of reasons and the possibility of rationally justifying and evaluating love. The driving intuition of such discussion has been the consideration that love seems to be selective. We love this particular person rather than that one, and we do not easily transfer our allegiance. This selectivity has inclined a variety of commentators (notably David Velleman and Niko Kolodny) to suggest that a rational explanation or justification of sorts can at least sometimes be given for love. Romeo may, for example, perhaps be in a position to explain his reasons for loving Juliet, even though he is not called upon to do so in their shared text. Others (notably Harry Frankfurt) have suggested that we do not love others for reasons but that love itself is a source of reasons for action. Romeo and Juliet may each have reasons for trying to run off with one another and for marrying one another should they survive "til the end of the performance. And so the debate on reasons has continued, with various modifications, qualifications, and adjustments. Rival accounts have advanced different candidates for exactly what the reasons for love might be (admirable properties, virtues, a shared relationship, and so on). Objections to each of the candidates have not been in short supply. There always seems to be something about actual instances of love that defies our best attempts to present an account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for love being the appropriate response.

DOI: 10.1057/9781137383310_1

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