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(2019) Synthese 196 (3).
The conservativeness argument poses a dilemma to deflationism about truth, according to which a deflationist theory of truth must be conservative but no adequate theory of truth is conservative. The debate on the conservativeness argument has so far been framed in a specific formal setting, where theories of truth are formulated over arithmetical base theories. I will argue that the appropriate formal setting for evaluating the conservativeness argument is provided not by theories of truth over arithmetic but by those over subject matters ‘richer’ than arithmetic, such as set theory. The move to this new formal setting provides deflationists with better defence and brings a broader perspective to the debate.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017-1495-8
Full citation:
Fujimoto, K. (2019). Deflationism beyond arithmetic. Synthese 196 (3), pp. 1045-1069.
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