Newsletter of Phenomenology

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(2015) Synthese 192 (10).

Fundamental physical ontologies and the constraint of empirical coherence

a defense of wave function realism

Alyssa Ney

pp. 3105-3124

This paper defends wave function realism against the charge that the view is empirically incoherent because our evidence for quantum theory involves facts about objects in three-dimensional space or space-time (local beables). It also criticizes previous attempts to defend wave function realism against this charge by claiming that the wave function is capable of grounding local beables as elements of a derivative ontology.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-014-0633-9

Full citation:

Ney, A. (2015). Fundamental physical ontologies and the constraint of empirical coherence: a defense of wave function realism. Synthese 192 (10), pp. 3105-3124.

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