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(2012) Synthese 187 (2).
Much philosophical effort has been exerted over problems having to do with the correct analysis and application of the concept of epistemic justification. While I do not wish to dispute the central place of this problem in contemporary epistemology, it seems to me that there is a general neglect of the belief condition for knowledge. In this paper I offer an analysis of ‘degrees of belief’ in terms of a quality I label ‘conviction’, go on to argue that one requires more conviction in a proposition in order to know it than to merely believe it, and conclude by suggesting that some current epistemological issues admit of new insight when we begin taking conviction seriously.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-010-9831-2
Full citation:
Anderson, D.J. (2012). Knowledge and conviction. Synthese 187 (2), pp. 377-392.
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