Newsletter of Phenomenology

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(2012) Synthese 185 (1).

Is artefactualness a value-relevant property of living things?

Ronald Sandler

pp. 89-102

Artefacts are often regarded as being mere things that possess only instrumental value. In contrast, living entities (or some subset of them) are often regarded as possessing some form of intrinsic (or non-instrumental) value. Moreover, in some cases they are thought to possess such value precisely because they are natural (i.e., non-artefactual). However, living artefacts are certainly possible, and they may soon be actual. It is therefore necessary to consider whether such entities should be regarded as mere things (like most non-living artefacts) or as possessing intrinsic value (like many, if not all) living entities. That is, it is necessary to determine whether artefactualness is a value-relevant property with respect to the intrinsic value of living things.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-9877-9

Full citation:

Sandler, R. (2012). Is artefactualness a value-relevant property of living things?. Synthese 185 (1), pp. 89-102.

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