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(1994) The unity of the mind, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

Functionalism and the machine model

D. H. M. Brooks

pp. 93-115

I have argued that the mind is a machine on the grounds that the explanation of the contents of our consciousness requires the positing of mechanisms whose workings we are not aware of and that if it is a machine we get an adequate accoimt of mental unity. These arguments are not conclusive.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-23178-2_7

Full citation:

Brooks, D. H. (1994). Functionalism and the machine model, in The unity of the mind, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 93-115.

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